Section 1 – The Cold War and National Armament

Chapter 1: The Cold War (1945–62)

Introduction

The story of the Minuteman missile program is a Cold War tale. Journalist Walter Lippmann's 1947 book, *The Cold War*, first used and popularized the term "cold war" to refer to the post-World War II confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years earlier, British author and journalist George Orwell called a world living in the shadow of a nuclear war "a peace that is no peace" and referred to it as a "cold war."[i] The term, Cold War, would come to define the political, social, and economic history of the second half of the twentieth century. More than merely a military standoff, the Cold War offered a stable international system forged by the world's emerging two superpowers–the United States and the Soviet Union–that lasted more than four decades. This system formed almost immediately following World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union epitomized the differences between a capitalist and a communist world. The conflict that arose between these two fundamentally irreconcilable systems, paradoxically based upon stability through mutual destruction, helped spawn development of new weapons systems, including the Minuteman I and II.[ii]

The use of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II forever altered the tone of international relations. The devastation caused on 6 August 1945 at Hiroshima and 9 August 1945 at Nagasaki led the world to fear an atomic war, and to fear what atomic weapons could do, even to their inventors. As H. V. Kaltenborn, one of the most respected American broadcasters of the period, told his listeners on the night of 6 August 1945, "We must assume that with the passage of only a little time, an improved form of the new weapon we use today can be turned against us."[iii] This fear dominated the Cold War, as policymakers and pundits alike recognized that any potential conflict could escalate to the point of global destruction once both superpowers possessed these weapons. Hiroshima changed everything, the Congressional Aviation Policy Board concluded in 1948, "Militarily speaking, at that same hour the security frontiers of all nations disappeared from the map. National defense, in the traditional sense, is no longer possible. The cycle of history has turned, and once again civilization stands vulnerable to annihilation."[iv]

With the benefit of hindsight, we may now clearly state that this overt threat of nuclear annihilation kept both sides from pursuing a more aggressive or expansionistic foreign policy as the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were very aggressive in maneuvering with third world countries in an attempt to tilt the theoretical balance of power in their own favor.

With nuclear weapons and the atomic bomb at the heart of this threat, American policymakers believed their country had to stay

technologically ahead of the Soviets if it was to survive. They were determined to maintain their atomic monopoly as long as possible, and thereafter to use their technological superiority for diplomatic leverage. The Soviet Union was bent upon global domination, policymakers reasoned, and if the Soviets believed that the American force could be defeated, it seemed likely that Moscow would strike. Technological superiority, in other words, when coupled with the ability to deliver unprecedented force, was required to maintain the peace.

The Minuteman missile program and the efforts of the military and civilian personnel of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing of Ellsworth Air Force Base are each a product of this Cold War system. In order to deter communist aggression, the United States developed the Minuteman I missile system with the ability to respond to an enemy attack with immediate and massive retaliation. The origins of the Cold War help to identify how the Soviet-American relationship deteriorated and the two sides became entrenched for over four decades–this background is fundamental to understanding why such powerful military weapons were deployed in South Dakota–some thousands of miles from the Soviet border. In the Cold War, as we shall see, the front line was everywhere.

Origins of the Cold War

Zones of Contention

The mutual antagonism of the Soviets and Americans, leading to the Cold War, developed after World War II as the two sides competed over a number of geographic and political zones of contention. In several confrontations and diplomatic situations, American policymakers in particular learned important lessons, including that the Soviet Union was no longer an ally, that Moscow intended to expand the physical realm of communism, and that the Soviets could only be deterred by force and the threat of force.

Two major conferences–Yalta and Potsdam–were held in 1945 with the Soviets, British, and Americans to determine the fate of Europe and defeated Germany. The Yalta Conference, at the Russian Black Sea resort in February, was the last meeting of the Big Three allied leaders–American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. At the conference, debates over Poland's postwar borders and government put Roosevelt and Churchill at odds with Stalin. Within months of Yalta, Soviet control over Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe had evolved into a serious concern for the future of Western Europe.[v]

Leaders of the three countries met again at the Potsdam Conference, outside of the captured Berlin, from 17 July to 2 August 1945. This was the last major conference of World War II, and its participants attempted to build upon the efforts of the Yalta Conference. However, the United States and Britain found themselves again unable to come to an agreement on many diplomatic issues with the Soviet Union. President Harry S. Truman, who had taken office following Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945, and many Potsdam attendees, saw the Soviet Union shifting from a wartime ally, even a frequently difficult one, to an outright adversary.[vi]

The postwar battle over the control of Germany and Berlin demonstrates how tensions evolved dividing Europe into East versus West. Germany was physically and ideologically divided between the two sides. For the United States, a strong rebuilt Germany capable of sustaining its own redevelopment while supporting its neighbors seemed vital to the success of Western Europe, while Soviet leaders longed for a ravaged Germany, incapable of ever again attacking the East. The superpowers' division over Germany's fate was centered symbolically on the country's former capital, Berlin. The United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union each had military troops stationed in Berlin–110 miles into the heart of the Soviet occupation zone and the future East Germany–and their presence led to the 1948 Berlin Blockade (discussed below).

American financial assistance toward the reconstruction of Europe following the war also contributed to a deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States emerged from the war with a strong economy, and was in the position to provide aid to Europe, a situation ultimately resented by the Soviets. Initially the United States offered aid on a country-by-country basis, with $3.75 billion going to the British in 1945-46 and $1.2 billion to France the following year.[vii] The Soviets requested $1 billion in aid in 1945, but due to crumbling East-West relations, the Truman Administration never formally approved an aid package for Moscow. State Department officials claimed to have "lost" the Soviet request, though later historians have proved their story was fabricated so as to provide justification for rejecting Moscow's plea. No matter the reason, Moscow's failure to garner American postwar aid proved a contentious issue in Soviet-American dealings.

The United States also faced conflict with the Soviets outside of Europe. The fate of China, for example, as a result of its civil war, was of crucial interest to the two superpowers if for no other reason than its status as the world's most populous country. Led by Mao Zedong, China's Communists eventually won power, leading to greater American concerns over the future of the capitalist system without its most populous member and to domestic attacks against the Truman Administration for "losing" China. Communism's victory in this crucial early Cold War battle helped American policymakers understand the growing threat of this dangerous new ideology and gave the United States a new and bitter adversary in Asia.

The Iranian Crisis of 1946 also contributed to the polarization of Soviet-American relations. Following World War II the Soviets agreed to end their occupation of northern Iran and remove their troops within six months of the conflict's end. When the Soviets did not comply with their wartime promise and continued to occupy northern Iran and use political and military pressure to gain oil concessions, President Truman threatened war and mobilized troops to the area. These actions forced the Soviets to withdraw without concessions, offering proof to American policymakers that the Soviets responded only to force. By 1947, therefore, tensions ran high between the East and West and American leaders had developed an increasingly hostile view of Russia.[viii]

Declarations of Cold War

Tensions between the two countries escalated during the post-World War II period and declarations by leaders on both sides, including Stalin and Churchill, and strategists, such as United States diplomat George Kennan, began to formally announce the existence of a Cold War. At the heart of their message was recognition of the posturing by the two superpowers with opposing ideologies and world views.

Such declarations of Cold War began as early as 1946. In February of that year, Stalin's Soviet Party Congress speech made the growing East-West conflict seem inevitable. Cold War historian Walter LaFeber discussed how Stalin's speech cast a pall over contemporary East-West negotiations,

> "In an election speech of February 9, the Soviet dictator announced that Marxist-Leninist dogma remained valid, for 'the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries' could lead to 'violent disturbance' and the consequent splitting of the 'capitalist world into two camps and the war between them.' War was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. The Soviet people must prepare themselves for a replay of the 1930s by developing basic industry instead of consumer goods and, in all, making enormous sacrifices demanded in 'three five-year plans, I should think if not more.' There would be no peace, internally or externally. These words profoundly affected Washington. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, one of the reigning American liberals, believed that Stalin's speech meant 'The declaration of World War III.' "[ix]

Two weeks after Stalin's speech, in late February, United States diplomat George Kennan responded to a State Department request for an analysis of Soviet expansionism and global intentions with what became another such declaration of a Cold War. Kennan's response, later given the descriptive title "The Long Telegram," warned that Soviet policies assumed western hostility and that Soviet expansionism was inevitable.[x] Moscow would only be deterred by forceful opposition, be it political or military, and Kennan thus recommended that the United States employ a policy of "long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment."[xi] His analysis was well received by United States policymakers who felt that the telegram confirmed their views and the tougher stance the Truman administration was taking with the Soviets.

One month later, in his March 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, ex-British Prime Minister Winston Churchill presented his views on the East-West conflict. Churchill coined the term "iron curtain" in this speech and outlined a global alliance between Europe and the United States, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow."[xii]

During the final passage of the American Treasury loan to Britain in July 1946, American Congressional leaders outlined their own declaration of Cold War, as they described the world as half free and half communist in order to win approval for the politically contested loan. Leaders, such as Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, argued that the United States must support its longtime ally in Britain, especially as the bipolar division of the world seemed impossible to overcome. The United States committed $3.75 billion in loans to Britain for reconstruction of its economy, which was, in the words of historian Derek Leebaert, the "first distinctly postwar commitment of U.S. economic and political power."[xiii] As Rayburn explained in defense of the loan, "I do not want Western Europe, England, and all the rest of Europe pushed toward an ideology that I despise" and "I fear that if we do not cooperate with our great natural ally [Britain] that is what will happen."[xiv] As Cold War historian Dr. Jeffery A. Engel has written, to thinkers like Rayburn, "Only a strong Great Britain, an unsinkable American island-base of anti-communism set off the coast of Europe could prevent Soviet domination of the continent, he argued, and only an economically strong Britain, a Britain strengthened by a $3.75 billion loan, could possibly remain solidly in the American camp."[xv]

American Cold War Policy

By 1947 it had become apparent to most observers that the world was splitting in two–East and West–leaving the inevitable conflict of the Cold War. Quickly the lines in the sand were drawn even deeper as the Soviets and Americans clashed ideologically and militarily on a number of fronts. In February, for example, Britain's decision to cease aid to Greek forces fighting a Communist insurgency prompted the Truman Administration to assume new responsibilities throughout all of Southern Europe. The ensuing "Truman Doctrine" committed $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey–a huge sum given Congressional fiscal conservatism at the time–and offered a precedent for further American assistance to any "free peoples" engaged in a struggle against "terror and oppression" and "the suppression of personal freedoms."[xvi] Truman's Manichean worldview pitted the world in two, good against evil, for to American policymakers, Communism seemed everywhere on the march. "Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one," Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained, "the corruption of Greece would infect Iran, and all to the East."[xvii] Without American aid, Europe and Africa would be next, he continued and "we and we alone could break up the [Soviet] play." Western Europe subsequently received its own brand of American economic stimulus later that year, with the Marshall Plan designed to promote economic recovery and stability as a vaccine against the Communist "infection." The Soviets refused to participate in the plan, which Foreign Minister Molotov denounced as a "new venture in American imperialism."[xviii] The Soviets offered their own aid package for Eastern Europe and, with dollars flowing to one half of the continent and rubles to the other, the division of East and West grew even deeper. The Truman Administration later followed-up this aid program to Europe with "Point Four," a program similarly designed to spread American technical know-how and dollars throughout the developing world as a means of countering Soviet expansion.[xix]

Conflict continued with the Soviet Union determined to push the United States and its allies out of West Berlin. In June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on West Berlin in an attempt to cut off supplies to the city. The United States and its allies began to supply the city with a massive airlift of unprecedented size, and the Soviets ended the

blockade in May 1949. The United States' commitment to Western Europe's defense, exemplified by efforts during the Berlin Blockade, led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. NATO provided for a collective defense of its members, as the organization's charter promised that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. NATO represented the United State's commitment to its European allies and would become an important key to containing the Soviet Union in Europe.[xx]

Shortly after the lifting of the Berlin Blockade, in August 1949, the Soviet Union broke the American nuclear monopoly by developing its own atomic bomb. The Soviets had matched the United States' key technology sooner than most expected. This development forced the United States to reevaluate its defense posture and accelerated the creation of even more powerful weapons, such as the hydrogen bomb, to regain its nuclear superiority. An analysis of the United States' defense position was presented to President Truman in the National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC 68). NSC 68, authored largely by Paul Nitze of the State Department policy staff, would come to shape American policy for many years. NSC 68 outlined that the United States needed to be prepared globally for Soviet or communist expansionism and that containment should become a global policy. The directives outlined in NSC 68 were written prior to the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel but were not adopted until September 1950, after this conflict proved to many the necessity of American military buildup.

By the early 1950s American foreign policymakers knew that the Cold War was here to stay. Communism seemed everywhere on the move, exemplified by the crises described above and then most dramatically with the North Korean invasion of June 1950 that began the Korean War. Western policymakers believed countries at risk from Communist aggression might fall if their neighbors succumbed, like the rotten apples of Acheson's metaphor or, more commonly, like so many dominoes: if one country was lost to the Communists, so too would be the next, and the next. Communism had to be stopped, but at what cost? The increasing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and the arms race would shape the United States strategic defense program and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) development. In the Cold War, the United States would maintain its stance that the only way to halt the expansion of communism was through development of increasingly advanced weapons systems. As we shall later see, one such system would be the Minuteman. Before that missile would be deployed, however, there would be events and developments, international and technological, which would shape this weapon and the communities that housed it.

Eisenhower and Waging Peace

The Cold War and the directives of NSC 68 led to a significant increase in American military spending. Just over $13 billion was spent on the country's defense in 1950, while only three years later total American defense spending exceeded $50 billion, or nearly forty percent of the federal budget.[xxi] Much of this increased spending can be attributed to the Korean War; however, many United States policymakers believed that defense spending would continue at this elevated level for the foreseeable future. Their predictions ultimately proved correct, as spending on American forces dipped after the war to approximately $34-

$38 billion a year, while military and financial aid delivered to allies in the name of halting communism averaged nearly $12 billion annually throughout the remainder of the decade. This level of Cold War spending became the norm until the height of the costly Vietnam War.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953 with a pledge to lower the cost of waging the Cold War, what he called "waging peace." He feared a prolonged military conflict and a commensurate expansion of the military and federal government might undermine the country's democratic values. President Eisenhower did not dispute NSC 68's basic principles, in particular its contention that Soviet Communism was inherently expansionistic and thus a threat to the United States, but he feared the effects of a broad Cold War fight on America's economy and society. Increased military spending could warp the marketplace, while efforts to combat Communism at home, if not carefully regulated, might ultimately undermine American civil liberties. As Eisenhower stated, his administration was charged with defending "a way of life," not just a territory and "We could lick the whole world if we were willing to adopt the system of Adolph Hitler."[xxii]

These were hardly idle concerns. During this same period, Senator Joseph McCarthy led the charge against Communism at home, popularly known as the Red Scare, with largely unsubstantiated accusations that Communists had infiltrated the federal government and the State Department in particular. McCarthy's accusations caused a sensation. Following televised Congressional hearings in 1954, where McCarthy accused the Army of harboring Communists, he was censured by the Senate for his actions. The country's rabid anti-Communist hysteria began to slow, though Cold War fears continued to color American political and cultural life for more than a generation. As Eisenhower had feared, anti-Communism, as espoused by McCarthy and others, was distorting American values.

As Commander-in-Chief and as a former Army General, Eisenhower at least exerted greater control over the military. He believed in the conservative (what earlier generations would have called republicanism or classical liberalism, terms that change over time though their meanings remain the same) ideal that democracy and militarism are forever at odds, as he held significant faith in civilian rule.[xxiii] Based on these beliefs he called for a reconsideration of the country's Cold War policies upon taking office. He initiated "Project Solarium"–named for the room of the White House where the project was discussed–which requested three blue-ribbon, top secret panels to separately consider and propose a strategy for America's Cold War policy.

Group A was headed by diplomat and Soviet expert George Kennan. Kennan's group concluded that since the Soviet threat remained strong, the previous administration's containment policy should be continued. They recommended continued expansion of defense spending and military buildup. As reported by Group A, "If we can build up and maintain the strength of the free world during a period of years, Soviet power will deteriorate or relatively decline to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and to world peace."[xxiv]

Group B was led by Air Force Major General James McCormack, an expert on atomic weapons. The members of McCormack's group proposed drawing a "line of no aggression" around the Communist Bloc and areas necessary to the United States security.[xxv] Entry or expansion beyond the line would result in an atomic attack on the Soviet Union. Group B's plan offered the advantage of limiting military spending, but featured two major obstacles: where to draw the line, and how to procure Congressional and public support for an atomic war should the Soviets cross the line.

Vice Admiral Richard Conolly headed up Group C in the discussion of the nation's future Cold War policy. His group advocated an aggressive approach to winning the Cold War and reversing Communism, a policy publicly dubbed "roll back." They stated that the United States should "prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means: military, economic, diplomatic, covert, and propaganda."[xxvi] Through aggressive means, Communism would be swiftly eradicated and democracy "restored."

President Eisenhower ultimately adopted none of the three options, choosing instead a combination of the first two, which were drafted into National Security Council Paper Number 162 (NSC 162), his administration's Cold War blueprint. NSC 162 advocated extensive reliance on nuclear weapons as the country's primary deterrent to Communist expansionism and aggression. It advocated vigilance against future Communist expansion but not direct roll back unless the United States was in position for victory. The policy focused on keeping America safe, but as importantly, also fiscally secure. No one in 1953 could predict how many years the Cold War would last and the administration felt strongly that it needed a policy that could be sustained for possibly a decade or more. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey explained, "if we mean to face this Soviet threat over a long time, we must spend less than we now are spending and do less than we now are doing."[xxvii]

Following Project Solarium and the revision of the document to NSC 162/2, the United States had a new doctrine for winning the Cold War at an affordable cost. NSC 162/2 called for the use of an atomic strike force capable of deterring the Soviets from action. To contain Communism, Eisenhower authorized the expansion of the country's nuclear arsenal and the stage was set for the continued development of nuclear weapons, including what would later be called the Minuteman missile. The number of atomic weapons grew from one thousand in 1953 to more than eighteen thousand by the time President Eisenhower left office in 1961. During this same period, America's military budget dropped from $50 billion in 1953 to an average of $34 billion with savings achieved largely through reductions in troop levels. The increase in the country's nuclear arsenal and the idea that Soviet threats and expansionism would be met with awesome power became known as the policy of "massive retaliation."

The Problem of Massive Retaliation

Massive retaliation limited the Eisenhower administration's policy options. The 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis in Vietnam, for example, demonstrated the limitations of too great a reliance on the nuclear response. Since 1945 the United States had supported France's efforts to defend its colonial presence in Indochina, both militarily and

economically, and in 1953, France and the United States adopted the Navarre Plan to prevent the Communist-led Viet Minh takeover of the region. That same year French General Henri Navarre established a military base at Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Vietnam in hopes of luring the Viet Minh into battle. The Viet Minh laid siege on the French and a standoff occurred, with the United States airlifting supplies to the French.

Many of Eisenhower's advisors, including National Security Council (NSC) Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford, believed the only way to save the French was by dropping atomic bombs on their opponents. Eisenhower rejected this suggestion, arguing that nuclear weapons were too destructive to use in a limited conflict, and perhaps too politically damaging to use at all. "You boys must be crazy," he said. "We can't use those awful things against the Asians for the second time in ten years. My God."[xxviii] Without support from either American ground forces or nuclear weapons, the French garrison fell to the Viet Minh on 7 May 1954.

The decision not to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam called into question the administration's policy of massive retaliation and deterrence. Massive retaliation might have been a successful policy for keeping the Cold War in balance and an option for stopping a major Soviet advance into Western Europe– although it was never put to this test–but it did not answer everything. If the administration was not ready to use nuclear weapons in all situations, Eisenhower's strategists reasoned, other options needed to be available to American leaders. Ironically, at an earlier time, Eisenhower had publicly stated that nuclear bombs were like any weapon, and could be "used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything else."[xxix] In

private, however, the president and his top advisors were each beginning to doubt the wisdom and utility of relying solely on the atomic threat. Despite their concerns, Soviet developments would soon prompt the United States to continue and even to expand its nuclear capabilities.

Sputnik

On 4 October 1957 the Soviets launched the world's first satellite, named Sputnik I. The launching shocked much of the world, not only for its scientific importance, but also because of the implications of this technology for American and Free World security. If the Soviets had rockets to launch satellites, many concluded that they would soon be able to develop ICBMs that could reach the United States. The Soviet achievement moreover demonstrated their technological lead in this field over the United States, and began the space race. As American security was predicated on maintaining technological superiority, Sputnik terrified the nation.

President Eisenhower responded by increasing spending on missile development. In January 1958, three months after the Soviets, the United States successfully launched its own satellite, after a number of publicized failures. At this same time, the Pentagon's feasibility studies for intercontinental missiles, including the Minuteman missile,

had been completed, and planning was underway for funding and development of this American military response.

Kennedy Administration and the First Minuteman Deployment

By the end of the 1950s, many Americans believed their country needed new Cold War policies. They feared for national security in an age of ballistic missiles, and they also questioned the effectiveness of the Eisenhower administration's policies for halting Communist expansion in the Cold War's periphery–those areas outside of Europe and the United States. Many observers believed the next great Cold War conflicts would occur in just these regions. Congress asked for hearings in 1959 to review the United States position in the space race, and Democrats subsequently campaigned against Republican Cold War policies, charging that they had allowed the Soviets to get ahead of the United States in missile development, creating a missile gap. The "gap" represented the difference between the number of missiles it was believed the Soviets possessed and the number of American missiles. Ironically, a missile gap did not exist. In actuality, the Soviets possessed significantly fewer missiles than most Americans believed and Democrats had claimed. Espionage and photographs from U-2 spy planes proved the deficiencies of Soviet nuclear arms, but the administration could not publicly state this fact without compromising national security and letting the world and the Kremlin know about the American spying capabilities. In the 1960 presidential election, Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Vice President Richard Nixon. Nixon had refused to compromise national security by leading a countercharge that refuted Democratic claims of a missile gap, and a new administration took office.[xxx]

Kennedy promised to improve American Cold War capabilities, including defense. He supported the Minuteman program and the country's continued development of ICBMs. Kennedy and his administration focused on a new Cold War policy to maximize policy options beyond a massive nuclear retaliation. This new policy became known as "flexible response," and included creation of new Cold War institutions, such as highly trained combat troops known as Green Berets or Special Forces, and even the Peace Corps. Kennedy also advocated vigilance towards the Soviets. His refusal to bend to Soviet pressure contributed to the Berlin Crisis of 1961 (when he activated his military reserves in response to Soviet demands that the West evacuate its military presence in the city, a crisis that culminated in Soviet construction of the Berlin Wall) and the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year, precipitated by Moscow's planned installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, only ninety miles from the American coast. An American quarantine of Cuba, and a secret agreement to dismantle Jupiter missiles in Turkey in exchange for removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, ultimately eased tensions and avoided disaster, though the world stood closer to the brink of nuclear war than arguably at any other time. Each crisis increased nuclear tensions between the superpowers, who wielded destructive power unknown and unimaginable to previous generations. It is in this context that the Minuteman was deployed and played its Cold War role.

Plate 1. The Big Three Conference at Yalta, 12 February 1945, from left to right: British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin
(AP/Wide World Photos)

Plate 2. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, United States President Harry S. Truman, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin meeting at the Potsdam Conference, August 1945 *(AP/World Wide Photos)*



Plate 3. First official picture of the Soviet satellite Sputnik I, issued on 9 October 1957, showing the four-antennaed baby moon resting on a three-legged pedestal *(AP/World Wide Photos)*

Plate 4. President Kennedy (*center*) with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (*far left*), SAC Commander General Thomas S. Power (*right*), and Lt. General Howell M. Estes, Jr. (*right background*) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, March 1962 *(Courtesy U.S. Air Force, History Division)*

[i] Michael Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1998), 3.

[ii] The history of The Cold War was compiled using the following sources: Kort, *Columbia Guide to the Cold War*; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1984*, Fifth ed. (New York, N.Y.: Newbery Award Records, Inc., 1985); Derek Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory*, 1st ed. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Company, 2002), Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1994).

[iii] Paul S. Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994), 5.

[iv] Eugene Emme, *The Impact of Air Power* (New York, N.Y.: Norstrand Company, Inc., 1959), 623-626.

[v] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War*, 180; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1984*, 14-15.

[vi] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War,* 160.

[vii] Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory*, 25.

[viii] Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory*, 23.

[ix] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1984,* 38.

[x] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War,* 138.

[xi] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War,* 138.

[xii] Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory,* 26; David Cannadine, ed., *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: Winston Churchill's Famous Speeches* (London: Cassell Publishers Limited, 1990), 303-304.

[xiii] Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory,* 25.

[xiv] Jeffery A. Engel, "'Every Cent from America's Working Man': Fiscal Conservatism and the Politics of International Aid after World War II," *The New England Journal of History* 58, no. 1 (2001): 20.

[xv] Engel, "'Every Cent from America's Working Man': Fiscal Conservatism and the Politics of International Aid after World War II," 22.

[xvi] For Truman Doctrine, see Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 121-127.

[xvii] For Acheson, see Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750* (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 477.

[xviii] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War,* 151.

[xix] For "Point Four," see David Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1942-1962* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

[xx] Kort, *The Columbia Guide to the Cold War,* 102, 157.

[xxi] H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *The American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (October 1989): 965.

[xxii] Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," 970.

[xxiii] On classical liberalism, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, N.Y.: Harcourt, 1985). For republicanism, see for

example, Bernard Bailyn, *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), and Daniel Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 79, No. 1. (Jun., 1992), 11-38.

[xxiv] Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," 966-967.

[xxv] Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," 967.

[xxvi] Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," 968.

[xxvii] Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," 969.

[xxviii] LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750*, 522.

[xxix] LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750,* 515.

[xxx] On Nixon and the Missile Gap, see Peter Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 112-149; and Christopher Preble, ""The Political Economy of National Security in the Nuclear Age: John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap" (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 2002).